• 教授课程
• 简历/背景
• 研究方向
• 研究项目
• 研究成果
• 获奖信息
• 社会活动

本科：博弈论基础 经济数学
研究生：经济数学

工作经历
2021.09 至今，可以买球赛的正规app，副教授
2014.08-2021.08，可以买球赛的正规app，讲师
教育经历
2009.09 - 2013.07，早稻田大学大学院经济学研究科，经济学博士
2006.09 - 2009.07，复旦大学经济学系，经济学硕士
2002.09 - 2006.07，天津财经大学经济学系，经济学学士
个人主页
https://sites.google.com/view/yajingchen

匹配与市场设计理论，中国经济

(1) 国家自然科学基金面上项目，随机分配问题中公平、效率与激励的权衡，2023.01-2026.12，主持
(2) 国家自然科学基金青年项目，离散资源随机分配机制的公理化研究，2018.01-2020.12，主持
(3) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目，离散型公共资源分配的机制设计，2017.07-2020.06，主持

(1) Chen, Y., Jiao, Z., Qin, W., & Shan, J. (2023). Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure. Operations Research Letters, 51(6), 638-642.
(2) Chen, S., Chen, Y., & Hsu, C. L. (2023). New axioms for top trading cycles. Bulletin of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12393
(3) Chen, Y., Harless, P., & Jiao, Z. (2023). The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization. Review of Economic Design. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7
(4) Chen, Y., Huang, Y., Jiao, Z., & Zhao, Y. (2022). A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice. Operations Research Letters, 50(5), 488-494.
(5) Chen, Y., Jiao, Z., Zhang, Y., & Zhao, F. (2021). Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand. Economics Letters, 202, 109814.
(6) Chen, Y., & Zhao, F. (2021). Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets. Economics Letters, 201, 109806.
(7) Chen, Y., & Jiao, Z. (2021). On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms. Operations Research Letters, 49(3), 300-303.
(8) Chen, Y., Jiao, Z., Shen, Z., & Tian, G. (2019). Affirmative action under common school priorities: The top trading cycles mechanism case. Operations Research Letters, 47(3), 190-196.
(9) Chen, Y. (2017). New axioms for deferred acceptance. Social Choice and Welfare, 48, 393-408.
(10) Chen, Y. (2016). New axioms for immediate acceptance. Review of Economic Design, 20, 329-337.
(11) Chen, Y. (2014). When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?. Mathematical Social Sciences, 71, 43-45.

Mathematical social sciences审稿人