报告题目：Upstream Collusion with Downstream Compensation（有下游补偿的上游串谋）

报告人：姚志勇（复旦大学）

报告时间：2024年5月8日（星期三）上午10:30-11:45

报告地点：可以买球赛的正规app大楼214

邀请部门：经济学系

报告人简介：

姚志勇，复旦大学管理学院应用经济学系教授、博导，北京大学经济学学士和硕士，美国加州大学洛杉矶分校（UCLA）经济学博士，主要从事微观经济学、产业经济学教学和科研工作，论文发表于Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Mathematical Economics等学术期刊，并主持多项国家与省部级科研项目。

报告摘要：

This paper investigates upstream collusion that needs to compensate downstream firms to prevent anti-trust litigations from them. Our analysis shows that the relationship between cartel incidence and upstream market concentration is non-monotonic and likely to be inverted U-shaped. As the compensation for downstream firms increases, the inverted U-shape becomes more pronounced. Although the compensation reduces the harm of upstream collusion to social welfare and consumer surplus, a small amount of compensation facilitates upstream collusion. These findings have important implications for antitrust policy and market regulation.