报告题目：Industry Structure and the Strategic Provision of Trade Credit by Upstream Firms（产业结构与上游企业对贸易信贷的策略供应）

报告人：Victor Song（加拿大西蒙菲莎大学）

报告时间：2020年12月10日（星期四）上午10:30-11:45

报告地点：可以买球赛的正规app大楼218会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

 

报告人简介：

Victor Song 博士, 加拿大西蒙菲莎大学彼迪可以买球赛的正规app金融与创新创业跨学科助理教授，毕业于加拿大卡尔加里大学, 获得经济学与金融学双博士学位。研究方向包括：公司金融财务，产业组织，应用博弈理论。Victor Song 博士多次获得由加拿大西蒙菲沙大学和卡尔加里大学授予的最佳教学奖; 并在Review of Financial Studies 等世界顶级金融期刊发表论文多篇。

报告摘要：

We explain trade credit financing as a strategic tool for a supplier to influence her retailer behavior in a product market, provide a new rationale for the existence as well as the contract structure of trade credit financing, and show why financially unconstrained firms occasionally finance their inventory with expensive trade credit. In our model competing supply chains deliver a homogeneous good to a market with imperfect competition where retailers have to make inventory decisions before demand is realized. When demand is weak trade credit financing makes the retailer more aggressive as he avoids having to finance unsold inventory at the high trade credit interest rate. The ex-ante expected cost of having to finance excess inventory at the high trade credit rate when demand is weak reduces retailers' optimal ex-ante inventory levels. When demand is high sales are constrained by inventory and competition is less intense. The modified product market behavior induced by trade credit financing increases the producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus in oligopoly markets, while we find no benefit for producers in either monopoly or perfect competition. We empirically confirm an inverse U-shape relationship of trade credit use and competition for a sample of U.S. firms.

本文对商业信用借贷的合约结构基于现有文献，提供了一个新的理论框架。一方面解释了，为什么在不受贷款约束的零售商仍然愿意选择貌似昂贵的商业信贷，与此同时，也解释了作为供给方如何运用商业信贷的合约特点去影响下游零售商在竞争总的销售行为，从而达到变相价格歧视的目的。