讲座一：

报告题目：Family Firm R&D Investments in the 2007-2009 Great Recession

报告人：孙娴  约翰霍普金斯大学管理学院金融助理教授

时间：2018年6月21日(星期四)  1:30-4:30

地点：可以买球赛的正规app新大楼205会议室

邀请部门：会计学系、公司财务研究所

报告简介：

Investments in research and development (R&D) are essential to advance innovation, long-term value creation, and wealth accumulation. Since family wealth and firm performance are tightly coupled in family firms, how they invest during times of economic distress matters to their wealth accumulation over the generations. In this study, we examined the impact of the 2007 Great Recession on the R&D decisions of publicly-listed family firms in the United States. We compared family and non-family U.S. firms, excluding those in the financial sector, with total assets greater than $1 million for the period from 1992 to 2015. Using behavioral agency model, we hypothesized that among the firms that were not financially constrained during the economic crisis, family firms were more likely than non-family firms to invest in R&D. The results support this hypothesis, lending credence to the notion that family firms undertook more risks when performance is below their aspirations during economic downturns to focus on long-term wealth creation. 

 

讲座二：

报告题目：The Rising of De Facto Power: China Evidence

报告人：孙娴  约翰霍普金斯大学管理学院金融助理教授

时间：2018年6月22日(星期五)  8:30-11:30

地点：可以买球赛的正规app新大楼205会议室

邀请部门：会计学系、公司财务研究所

报告简介：

Using the anti-corruption campaign launched in China in 2012, we examine how the rise of the economic presence of the private sector impacts economic activities and outcome. Although the economic activities may be temporarily inversely impacted by the campaign because some government officials are less motivated to make economic decisions to avoid any chance of making “mistakes”, industries located in provinces with higher presence of the private sector may be impacted less. We conjecture that the private sector has possessed greater de facto power through the economic resources accumulation during the rapid economic growth and therefore may have pushed for changes in economic/political policies in favor of its interest. Thus as the role of the political institution in making economic decisions become suddenly weakened because of anti-corruption campaign, the economic activities of these provinces with higher de facto power are less impacted. Controlling for province, industry, and year fixed effects, we find that while the growth of the industry gross output value reduces after the campaign, the businesses located in provinces with higher de facto power are less impacted. We further conjecture that not all economic presence necessarily leads to the rising of de facto power in the private sector. In highly regulated industries where the government desires to retain the controlling influence, the private sector has little chance of pushing for policies in favor of its interest. We find that the mitigation effect of the de facto power on economic slowdown is particularly driven by the non-regulated industries.

 

报告人简介：

孙娴，现任教于约翰霍普金斯大学管理学院金融助理教授。2000年毕业于上海交通大学， 获金融和科技外语双学士学位。2000年赴美就读于任斯利尔理工大学，于2002年获MBA学位，2006年获金融博士学位。毕业后任职于美国货币监督署风险分析部，为该部的资深经济学者。2009年被约翰斯霍普金斯大学管理学院录用为金融助理教授。孙娴博士的研究方向为新兴金融市场研究、公司合购并购、公司国际发展策略、公司上市研究、CEO的佣金设计与影响、公司债权合同研究和金融市场风险与稳定等，相关成果发表在已在一流金融研究期刊上。