发布者：可以买球赛的正规app办公室 时间：2017-04-17 阅读次数：1860
报告题目：Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Semi-exclusive Information
报告人：肖明军(助理教授，武汉大学)
报告时间：2017年4月20日(周四) 下午14:00-16:00
报告地点：老图书馆104
邀请部门：可以买球赛的正规app经济学系
主持人：杨剑侠
报告内容摘要: This paper approaches the classic implementation problem with interdependent valuations in a new way. Instead of exploring conditions on preferences, we introduce a semi-exclusive information structure that can help implement efficient or inefficient social choice rule in generic environments. Semi-exclusive information allows agents to observe noisy signals about their opponents’ payoff types. This piece of information can provide a tool for the designer to verify other agents’ private information. Thanks to this tool, we could restore the implementation of efficiency that would not have been possible following the routine method of finding global or local sorting conditions. We study generic environments that include settings with preferences not satisfying “single crossing conditions,” or other similar sorting conditions. The role of semi-exclusive signal is targeted to align the incentive constraints. We explore the implementability of efficient rule and other properly specified rules both when this information structure is static and when it is dynamic. While both setups can implement general allocation rules, the static setting sheds light on Crémer and McLean (1985,1988)’s utilization of correlation and the dynamic setting steps away from Crémer and McLean’s world and explores the correlation after the allocation decisions.
报告人简介：肖明军，经济学博士，武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授，2015年获斯坦福(Stanford)大学经济学博士。2005-2009年就读于上海财经大学经济学院硕博连读专业，师从机制设计知名学者田国强教授，2005年获得华中科技大学经济学、数学双学士学位。研究方向：微观理论、机制设计。
introduction-Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Semi-exclusive Information.pdf
