报告题目：Contract Bargaining with Risk-averse Agent 报告人：李三希博士 报告时间：2013年4月1日（星期一）上午9:30—11:30 报告地点：三教102 主持人：于立宏教授 邀请单位：经济学系产业经济学教研室
摘要：
This paper is the first to study a Nash bargaining model in a moral hazard framework where the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. We show that the power of incentives increases with the agent’s bargaining power if the contracts induce a high e¤ort. However, under reasonable assumptions about the agents utility function, the contracts induce a high e¤ort less often as the agent’s bargaining power increases. As for the social welfare, we are surprised to find that a utilitarian, who cares about the sum of the two parties. certainty equivalents, is worse o¤ as the agent’s bargaining power increases. These results are in sharp contrast to the literature, which features risk-neutral agents protected by limited liability. Our results are consistent with evidence in the insurance market, which suggest that group insurance contracts often o¤er higher levels of coverage, lower deductibles and lower out-of-pocket maximum spending limits than individual insurance contracts.
报告人简介：
李三希，人民大学经济学院讲师。博士毕业于图卢兹经济学院，师从著名的激励大师David Martimort教授。研究领域为信息经济学、产业组织、配对和风险分担。在《Economics Letters》、《Mathematical Social Science》、《Journal of Economics》、《Revue Economique》等国际知名经济学期刊上发表论文多篇,并为《Journal of Public Economics》和《International Journal of Industrial Organization》的匿名审稿人。
